In Defence Of Britain's Nuclear Deterrent

The UK absolutely should not dissolve its nuclear deterrent; but given the current threats there may be a better way to retain it.

The UK is one of 9 nations currently in possession an independent nuclear stockpile. The UK's stockpile was originally developed once it became clear the US would not share the technology developed within the partnership of the Manhattan Project the UK's nuclear deterrent was originally envisioned as a guarantee of British security from a nuclear strike by the Soviet Union through the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 Britain still maintains its nuclear arsenal, deployed on the ‘continuous at sea deterrent’ (CASD) even in the face of the enormous associated political and economic costs. Britain’s CASD is composed of four Vanguard Class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), allowing one to be always on patrol while the other three go through refit, rest or training. Each submarine can carry 16 Trident II ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which in turn are capable of carrying 12 nuclear warheads (though the neither the submarines nor missiles currently carry full loads). Economically, Britain has been able to greatly reduce the costs of developing and maintaining nuclear weapons by buying aspects of its CASD from the US. 58 Trident II ICBMs from the (US) and heavily basing the designs of its nuclear warheads on the US W76 warhead. As a result of using this ‘off-the-shelf' nuclear deterrent, the UK has been able to maintain what British security and defence scholar Robert Self has described as "Great power status on the cheap. However, maintaining this deterrent still has financial implications for meeting other security threats since it costs 5% of the defence budget annually. Britain’s economic savviness in how it acquires it nuclear weapons also comes with possible strategic costs. Questions are often asked regarding how independent British nuclear defence policy can really be, given how dependent the UK deterrent is on US technology and how vulnerable the single submarine on patrol might be to a first strike. Nuclear weapons also face heavy political opposition. Globally, of the 195 states recognised by the United Nations (UN), 191 are signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Furthermore, there are five nuclear weapons free zones where the countries within have agreed not manufacture, acquire, test, or possess nuclear weapons; of these, 4 are combined to cover the entire southern hemisphere, reflecting how widespread opposition to these weapons is. In spite of these drawbacks, proponents of maintaining the deterrent argue that the threat of a nuclear strike on Britain has not gone away; while the world is stable and the threat of nuclear war is low right now this does not mean that tensions will not rise in the future. Because of this, they argue that it would be irresponsible to dispose of Britain’s independent deterrent given that it would likely be impossible for Britain to acquire it again if it were disposed of. In fact from the three key perspectives of economic, strategic (security), and political costs Britain's nuclear arsenal is cost/benefit bargain. These are the three key perspectives because in order for a nuclear arsenal to have a deterrent effect it must represent the ability of a country to reliably deliver a ‘second-strike’ capability, meaning it must be technologically advanced enough to avoid detection; therefore, having a nuclear deterrent is a technological feat, requiring an economic commitment on the part of the state deploying it, and an inherently political act. Britain’s nuclear arsenal therefore has economic, strategic, and political implications on the country’s ability to meet its current security threats.

The case for maintaining Britain’s continuous at sea deterrent:

There is certainly a case to be made for maintaining Britain’s CASD as it currently exists. In his article for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace John Gower has argued that strategically Britain’s nuclear arsenal certainly is not obsolete in the face of nuclear strike as a security threat to Britain. The destructive power nuclear weapons can inflict has meant their mere existence has fundamentally changed the face of warfare and made deterrence the doctrine of nuclear defence policies around the world. Even before their invention, Britain recognised the potential to weaponize the splitting of the atom embarked upon doing so, only to be constrained by the realities of fighting in a world war at the time and thereby being forced to partner with the US through the Quebec Agreement. Following the US’ betrayal of the Quebec Agreement with the 1946 McMahon Act, policy makers in Britain once again set to work getting the Union Jack flying on top of its own nuclear weapon. This was successfully tested in 1952 despite the enormous financial cost. This was done in recognition of the folly of Britain relying on US guarantees of avenging her in the event of her destruction, and thereby risking bringing that destruction on themselves, was not a sound defence policy. This judgement was proved sound after the end of the Cold War when historians in Poland revealed the existence of Soviet battle plans that involved nuclear attacks on European NATO alliance members that carefully avoided strikes on Britain and France in the hopes of avoiding nuclear retaliation demonstrating the effectiveness of the MAD doctrine. During the Cold War, at least, maintaining a nuclear arsenal was a good idea. However, despite the end of the Cold War the threat of nuclear war still exists. Today, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute there are still approximately 13,400 nuclear warheads held by nine countries; of those, 3720 are deployed with operational forces and approximately 1800 are kept in a state of high operational alert. The UK’s own stockpile is modest in comparison with the global total, approximately 120 operational warheads of 215 total. Despite its modest size the UK CASD is also as effective as it can be given the limited aims Britain envisions for it: providing the most basic level of deterrent and fulfilling Britain’s commitments to its NATO allies. Having one submarine on constant patrol is as effective as the French CASD (though France does also nuclear weapons for use by its air force). As well as this, from an economic perspective it is difficult to argue that Britain’s nuclear arsenal does not represent extreme value for money. France, which possesses a near identical CASD but develops its warheads completely independently of the US, spends somewhere in the region of £5.3 billion every year (approx.12% annual defence budget). For comparison, the cost of Britain’s nuclear deterrent is approximately £2 billion per year and represents only 5% of the UK’s defence budget.

The Case for dismantling Britain’s nuclear arsenal:

There is however also a strong case for dismantling the UK's nuclear deterrent.

Strategically, criticisms are levelled at the UK arsenal due to (i) only one submarine being on patrol at any time, leaving the deterrent vulnerable to a first strike and (ii) for its operational independence given the extremely high level of US involvement in supplying the missiles and designs for the warheads.

In 2014 The British American Security Information Council (BASIC) report to Parliament in 2014 pointed out: “If the US were to withdraw their cooperation completely the UK nuclear capability would probably have a life expectancy measured in months…”. This raises the question as to whether the British nuclear arsenal might be used if the US decided to launch a first strike on an adversary to prevent criticisms of unilateralism. Furthermore, the vulnerability to first strike has been touched on above as outlined by international relations scholar Mark Bell in his 2017 article on nuclear opportunism for the Journal of Strategic Studies: in order for Britain’s arsenal to fill the role of a deterrent it must be able to deliver a reliable second-strike capability, without this reliability it loses all of its deterrent factor.

As any enemy conducting a first strike would also be sure to track down and destroy the UK’s one Vanguard class submarine on patrol before launching their nuclear attack the UK’s nuclear arsenal has lost its deterrent factor. Increasingly, the Vanguard class submarines are vulnerable to detection simply due to their age from wear to the hulls and from the rapid advance of technology. Developments in satellites, ships, aircraft, and hunter-killer submarines have made the hunting of nuclear missile submarines much more effective. Detection methods themselves are also only improving; sub-surface drones can loiter indefinitely in the Firth of Clyde, which the Vanguard submarines must sail through in order to leave their home port and track them throughout their patrol all while constantly transmitting the submarine’s location to the UK’s enemies. This obviously nullifies the deterrent by making it incredibly vulnerable.

In light of the criticisms of the strategic vulnerability the British CASD suffers questions are certainly raised over the point of spending £2 billion per year, on submarines that are not targeted (the missiles on board do not have pre-designated targets) or even held at 15 minutes readiness to launch (further increasing their vulnerability to interference), and an estimated £40 billion in lifetime costs (allowing for no budget overruns). The sanity of the economic commitment of maintaining the arsenal is therefore called into question regardless of the value for money the capability may represent.

Currently, the Royal Navy’s conventional forces consist of only 30 major combatants; of these only six are destroyers and 12 are frigates while there are two aircraft carriers with the remainder being the submarine force. This represents a massive misbalance in capability. In order for the two aircraft carriers to safely operate they must be escorted by at least two frigates, one destroyer and one attack submarine . With training and repair cycles this would reduce the Royal Navy to an escort service with no ships left to protect the UK’s home waters. For the financial resources Britain invests into its defunct nuclear deterrent could have had at least another eight attack submarines or a mix of conventional and nuclear boats and 15 (or more) extra frigates. As it stands Britain’s economic policy with regard to its nuclear arsenal is neither, nor. It is neither affordable nor does it allow for the navy to run effectively to meet conventional threats Britain may need to respond to and it does this while itself not being an effective deterrent.

It is seriously doubtful whether, with the drawbacks of the nuclear arsenal compared to its benefits outlined above, those who argue the possession of the deterrent enhances the UK’s reputation can be serious in their conviction. Referring again to Mark Bell’s theory on how states use nuclear weapons in international politics we can see that maintaining the nuclear arsenal only damages the UK’s reputation. Bell argues that states which have recently acquired a nuclear deterrent will pursue one of four branches of foreign policy: aggression to threat; independence; expansion, bolstering junior allies and steadfastness against rivals (in the case of a rising power); or steadfastness against decline (if the state is not rising in power). In 1952, Britain clearly would fall into that last category as she sought to boost her reputation by having a weapon befitting of a great power. Today though Britain is clearly a junior ally, dependent on US patronage as a guarantee of her security.

It is also important to consider some of the other security threats currently facing Britain to emphasise just how inappropriate a deterrent to these threats Britain’s nuclear deterrent is. Russia’s resurgence is one such example. Rather than being the return to ‘great power competition’ China represents, Russia’s threat of ‘hybrid warfare’ characterised by destabilising its opponents is much more likely to affect the UK and these attacks are already happening (in the case of China, the UK is likely to play a supporting role to the US’ policy). Russia regularly performs provocative activities, sending bombers to fly near British airspace, ships and submarines to spy near British territorial waters, and cyberattacks to disrupt UK infrastructure. The UK government has also specifically claimed that it was Russia that was responsible for the massive cyberattack on the NHS in 2017 and the poisoning of former spy, Sergei Skripal, on British soil in 2018. Outside of public office there is also much speculation on alleged Russian interference in the UK’s Brexit vote in 2016 . With these types of attack clearly a retaliatory nuclear strike is inappropriate. Yet by maintaining the nuclear arsenal the British government has hobbled itself in its ability to effectively respond to these threats. This is not just a reflection of misplacing funding; the prioritisation of nuclear weapons represents mistaken priorities in the minds of British officials. In 2019 Britain was marked as the second best prepared to meet a global pandemic according to the Global Health Index. However, a lack of understanding among senior government officials led to them grossly underestimating the threat a global pandemic represented when it did arrive in 2020. This led to a complete mishandling of the crisis to such an extent that the UK has the seventh highest number of corona deaths in the world. Maintaining the nuclear arsenal is not just a financial folly, it represents yet another way Britain has been unable to leave behind its pretensions of great power status, a status it has not really possessed since the second world war gutted her treasury’s coffers and collapsed her empire around her.

The optimal solution: The case for placing the nuclear arsenal in ‘ready-use’ storage:

On balance then it seems that disposing of Britain’s nuclear arsenal is the best route in a choice between maintaining the CASD and disposal. However, there is a third way. The UK could repurpose its deterrent by retiring its Vanguard Class submarines when they reach the end of their useful service life at the end of the 2020s without using the incoming Dreadnought class boats as a like-for-like replacement. Instead, the UK could make use of the control it does have over its nuclear warheads and place them into ‘ready use’ storage. This would greatly reduce their operating costs from an estimated £140.5 billion across the lifetime of the Trident replacement to a fraction of that. Currently it costs the British government somewhere in the region of £500 million per year to store nuclear its old nuclear submarines that it is unable to decommission, while this is a large sum it is nothing compared to the costs of running an active deterrent which requires very high operational tempo. This increases wear on the submarines, the need for the skill level of the crew and paying for the US to maintain UK Trident II missiles (to say nothing of the warheads themselves). The cost of keeping a CASD is somewhere in the region of £2billion per year while this essay has discussed this above it is crucial to emphasise that this is an expense Britain does not need and can ill afford.

Placing the deterrent into ‘ready use’ storage would also allow the UK to hit the international sweet spot between its commitments to protecting its allies and fulfilling its commitments to the NPT without having to disarm unilaterally. Were the UK to unilaterally disarm it may be seen as shirking its duties as a NATO member and could even result in its removal from the alliance. This relegation of responsibility could be interpreted as Britain stepping back from its role in the world, something which the British people have made clear they do not want. By placing its warheads into storage Britain would be making a huge leap forward in its compliance with the NPT, it would re-establish the UK as a leading country with global moral standing and would be a significant easing of financial pressures to the defence budget. In short, it would be a real step back into global leadership for Britain which has since the end of World War Two, effectively danced to the US’ international relations policy tune in order to enjoy “great-power-by-proxy status”.

Some parting thoughts:

The nuclear deterrent is far too expensive for Britain to realistically maintain in the current financial climate. Economically, the deterrent is such a drain on the UK treasury’s coffers that the rest of the navy has been left so shorthanded as to have to choose between assembling one carrier strike group and protecting the UK British Isles. Politically too, maintaining the nuclear deterrent is a liability. It damages Britain’s reputation as a moral leader on the globe and has meant British leaders have placed far too high an importance on supporting American interests in order to ensure their continued supply of US technology thereby exposing the UK to greater security risks. Strategically, the deterrent is obsolete in any case. Technology is advancing far too quickly for submarines to be able to hide in the Atlantic for months at a time on patrol carrying the deterrent and other delivery methods are not viable for the UK. The deterrent is also a distraction from other more pressing security concerns and in the case of the Coronavirus has already resulted in a loss of focus on the part of the British government. While Britain’s nuclear arsenal still has a role given the UK’s international commitments to its allies the continuous at sea deterrent has become obsolete; given the financial and political implications maintaining the nuclear deterrent has on Britain’s ability to meet more pressing security threats.